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Abstract:  The establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 
has led to the creation of a whole range of bureaucratic bodies in Brussels and the national 
capitals. These bodies support the crisis management operations of the European Union. This 
review article presents the state of the art of academic research on the role of bureaucracy in 
this recent policy area. It argues that the growing institutional complexity and the constant 
interaction between actors at the national and European level require scholars to go beyond 
the dominant approaches of International Relations. Using insights from comparative politics, 
public administration and multi-level governance, this article considers four important 
questions: who these civil servants are, why they matter, how they interact, and how they are 
controlled politically and democratically. 
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1. Introduction 
At the Cologne European Council (June 1999) European Union (EU) member states decided 
to create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of their Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP).1 While the EU is not yet a fully-fledged international actor, this 
policy has certainly helped the Union to make a more significant impact abroad. In the past 
decade, the EU has launched 24 civilian and military operations, ranging from peace-keeping 
to rule of law missions (see for example: Howorth 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2008; 
Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009; Menon 2009). It has not only been active in its 
‘neighbourhood’, but also in countries as remote as Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan. While 
several of these operations were relatively small-scale and considered as not particularly 
successful, the EU's new role as a crisis manager marks a fundamental break with the past 
when European foreign policy amounted to little more than well-meant declarations. 
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The European Union has faced several challenges on the road towards an operational foreign 
policy in terms of civilian and military crisis management. These included, notably, the 
availability of human and material capabilities, but also the establishment of supporting 
institutional and bureaucratic structures. The earlier practice of running and implementing 
European foreign policy as much as possible from the national capitals, facilitated by the 
rotating Presidency, was at odds with the functional needs of a professional crisis 
management organisation. It required coordinated action and quick reaction to international 
events. Existing structures in the Council Secretariat and the European Commission were 
therefore reinforced, and a whole range of new diplomatic and military bodies has been 
established in Brussels since 1999. At the national level, the ministries of foreign affairs lost 
their monopoly over European foreign policy, as other ministries, such as interior and 
defence, had to deliver the police forces and soldiers necessary for operations. Finally, a chain 
of command was established, ranging from the Operational Headquarters to the supporting 
services on the ground. 
 
The central argument of this review article is that the growing institutional complexity in EU 
foreign policy-making raises new questions and requires scholarly approaches other than that 
of International Relations, traditionally employed in the study of European foreign policy. 
The growing institutionalisation and 'bureaucratisation' imply that policy-making can no 
longer be seen as a form of purely intergovernmental cooperation where everything is decided 
upon in national capitals. While foreign policy continues to follow an integration logic of its 
own – consensus remains the rule and the role of supranational institutions is restricted – the 
constant interaction between actors at national and European level makes foreign policy-
making less distinct from other EU policy areas than before. Therefore it becomes 
increasingly appropriate to use insights from comparative politics, public administration and 
(multi-level) governance.  
 
We advocate such an approach for several reasons. Firstly, it allows us to look beyond the 
political level (especially of national governments) into the key role of non-elected actors. As 
this article shows, it was mainly political actors that established the ESDP, yet this focus 
alone is not sufficient to capture the dynamics and mechanisms in policy formulation and 
implementation. Much of the day-to-day policy-making is done through the supporting 
administrative level. It is, in this respect, well-known that civil servants tend to be more than 
merely neutral process managers. Since traditional International Relations approaches 
generally treat states as unitary actors, bureaucratic actors are often ignored. Secondly, such 
an approach allows ESDP scholars to build upon an extensive research tradition in the other 
disciplines of social science. Insights from inter alia (neo)-institutionalism, multi-level 
governance, policy networks an bureaucratic politics, provide an excellent point of departure, 
but at the same time one must be wary of simply ‘copying and pasting’ concepts and 
analytical frames; analytical tools need adaptation to the peculiarities of ESDP. In return, 
applying them to the policy area of ESDP may allow for a refinement and adjustment of the 
existing frames and concepts. Finally, opening up the study of ESDP to the broader literature 
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on public policy-making allows us to get beyond its isolation in policy analysis and removes 
the resulting n=1 problem. It furthermore creates opportunities for a more intense dialogue 
between a rather secluded group of foreign policy scholars and the broader academic 
community working on European integration. Given the increasingly important 'cross-pillar' 
nature of many foreign policy dossiers and the need for institutional consistency (Stetter 
2004; Eriksson and Rhinard 2009), such interaction should only be endorsed. 
  
This article gives an overview of the state of the art of the analytical research on ESDP 
bureaucracy. It starts with a short description of the policy itself and with a demonstration of 
the growing multitude of bureaucratic actors at various levels. Subsequently, it raises four 
important questions when studying the role of administrative actors in ESDP. Firstly, this 
article examines who these ESDP officials are and explores current research on their 
professional and educational background, loyalty, and norms and values. Secondly, it 
discusses why these ESDP officials matter. An important rationale for studying civil servants, 
after all, is to analyse under which conditions they assert political influence. Thirdly, the 
interactions between the various bureaucratic units are analysed. This not only concerns 
intra- and inter-institutional relations in Brussels and the member states but also between the 
EU and other international organisations, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the United Nations. Finally, this article raises the normative question of political and 
democratic control of these non-elected career bureaucrats. 
 
2. ESDP: Capabilities and Operations 
During the first ten years of ESDP, the European Union has launched a remarkable number of 
24 crisis management operations, of which fourteen were civilian, seven military and three 
civil-military (see Table 1). The quantity of operations has been assessed as “impressive” 
(Menon 2009, 228) with a “remarkable increase in scale, distance and diversity” (Giegerich 
and Wallace 2004, 164). The quality in terms of “external political impact” was evaluated as 
“significant” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2008, 199), yet their small size and short duration 
of ESDP operations is widely acknowledged.  
 
Getting ESDP started was, however, a “painful path from shadow to substance” (Wallace 
2005, 429). After the failed ratification of the European Defence Community in 1954, 
defending Europe became the prerogative of NATO. Despite the repeated acknowledgement 
of the  European Community member states for the need of a stronger and closer security 
cooperation after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) only 
vaguely envisaged “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence” (art. J/4). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) called for a 
“progressive framing of a common defence policy” (art. 17), but the Kosovo conflict broke 
out (1998-1999) before it could enter into force. The reaction of the EU member states proved 
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inappropriate once again and triggered finally the political commitment to establish a 
European Security and Defence Policy. 
 
Table 1: Overview EU missions from 2003 to 2010 (status: 10.05.2010) 
Total: 24 
Completed 
10 
Ongoing 
14 
Military 
 
7 
4 3 
Concordia (FYROM) 
Artemis (DR Congo) 
EUFOR RD Congo 
EUFOR Chad/RCA 
EUFOR Althea (Bosnia) 
EU NAVFOR (Somalia) 
EUTM Somalia 
Civilian-military 
 
3 
1 2 
EU Support to AMIS (Darfur/Sudan) 
EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau) 
EUSEC RD Congo 
Civilian 
 
14 
5 9 
EUPOL Proxima (FYROM) 
EJUST Themis (Georgia) 
EUPOL Kinshasa (DR Congo) 
ACEH monitoring mission (Indonesia) 
EUPAT (FYROM) 
EUPM BiH (Bosnia) 
EUPOL RD Congo 
EUJUST Lex (Iraq) 
Border Mission Moldova/Ukraine 
EU BAM Rafah 
EUPOL COPPS (Palestine Territories) 
EUPOL Afghanistan 
EUMM Georgia 
EULEX Kosovo 
 Data from  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN 
 
The bilateral Saint-Malo Declaration between France and the United Kingdom in December 
1998 is generally considered as the starting point of ESDP. Europe's two major military 
powers, which had until then held very different views on European security, agreed that “the 
Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises” (art. 2). At the subsequent Cologne European Council in June 1999, the member states 
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officially established the ESDP, envisaging “autonomous action backed up by credible 
military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies” (European Council 1999a, p. 
37, emphasis added) in order to carry out the full range of Petersberg Tasks as agreed upon in 
the Amsterdam Treaty: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace making” (art. 17/2).  
  
Once the member states had secured political agreement for ESDP, they had to address 
assessing the civilian and military capabilities of the member states and the set-up of 
appropriate structures in Brussels. In December 1999, the European Council adopted the 
Helsinki Headline Goals as a first benchmark for military capabilities: the member states 
pledged to be able by 2003 to deploy within sixty days 50-60,000 soldiers for a period of at 
least one year. The European Council also created the first permanent ESDP decision-making 
bodies in Brussels (see below). In terms of civilian crisis management, the Feira European 
Council (June 2000) identified four priority areas (police, strengthening the rule of law, of 
civilian administration and civilian protection), for which some 5,000 police officers would be 
available. Close cooperation with the civilian crisis mechanisms of the European Community 
was furthermore emphasised (European Council 2000a), as already various Community 
instruments in these fields existed (Duke and Ojanen 2006; Schroeder 2007; Dijkstra 2009).  
  
Achieving the Helsinki and Feira targets became an important focal point for ESDP until 
2003, as only a low number of European troops were adequately trained for actual 
deployment. A fundamental shift was required from “quantity to quality”, in order to provide 
professional soldiers with sufficient training, and who also possessed the requisite of political, 
cultural, social and linguistic skills (Howorth 2007, 96-104). Several Capability Improvement 
Conferences were held in Brussels from November 2000-onwards to assess the civilian and 
military forces of the member states. The Nice European Council (December 2000) 
highlighted the need to improve availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability 
of forces, and asked for serious efforts to be made in terms of strategic intelligence, as well as 
air and naval transport capabilities (European Council 2000b). It also formalised the ad hoc 
bureaucratic bodies that had been set-up by the Helsinki European Council (see below). 
  
In December 2001, the Laeken European Council finally deemed that “the EU is now able to 
conduct some crisis-management operations” due to progress made during the various 
capability conferences and as a result of the rapidly developing institutional structures. At the 
same time, however, it pointed out that for the full range of Petersberg tasks “substantial 
progress will have to be made” (European Council 2001, p. 28). To avoid member states 
spending scarce resources unnecessarily, the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement (2003) gave the 
European Union access to NATO assets (e.g. planning capacity, SHAPE headquarters, 
logistics, communication) during its crisis management operations. 
  
The first civilian and military ESDP operations started in 2003. The European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) took over the United Nations Police Training Mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The military operation Concordia (March-December 2003) 
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followed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), effectively taking over a 
previous NATO operation and making use of the Berlin Plus arrangements. Using French 
facilities under the 'framework nation' concept, the first 'autonomous' ESDP military mission 
called Artemis was deployed in Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) in order to 
protect internally displaced persons and civilians, and to provide support for the UN mission 
on the ground. Finally in December 2003, a police mission known as EUPOL Proxima started 
in FYROM.  
  
Lessons were learnt from these first operations, especially regarding the EU’s capabilities that 
now again came to the fore of attention. The Helsinki Headline Goals had proven insufficient 
and inflexible, with the EU striving for “the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus 
sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement” (External 
Relations Council 2004, 1). To tackle these shortcomings a process similar to the earlier 
attempts like in 1999 and 2000 was started. First, a military Headline Goal 2010 and a 
Civilian Headline Goal 2008/2010 were set up, which would be regularly reviewed and 
adapted. Secondly, annual conferences would ensure that capabilities improved towards these 
goals. And thirdly – and for the focus of this article most interestingly – various bureaucratic 
bodies were tasked with engaging in a process of improving capabilities and planning 
(External Relations Council 2004, 5; Howorth 2007). The member states, in this respect, also 
established the European Defence Agency in 2004 to facilitate the cooperation between 
member states in acquiring better capabilities.  
  
Parallel to these developments, the member states continued to launch ESDP operations in 
Bosnia, Georgia, the Palestinian Territories, Aceh, and the DR Congo (2004-2006). While 
these operations clearly consolidated the EU record in civilian and military crisis 
management, a real quantitative leap forward in terms of number but also size of missions 
came only in 2007-2008, when the member states started planning the ambitious civilian 
missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and the military operation in Chad. These missions 
were challenging from a security, political, and logistical perspective and confronted the EU 
with significant problems in terms of planning and implementation, providing again feedback 
for future development. 
  
This brief account shows that the creation of ESDP was at the outset decided by national 
politicians. The more specific set-up of certain procedures, adjustment of capabilities, and 
implementation were to a large extent, however, shaped by bureaucratic actors. The next 
section discusses these players in more detail. 
 
3. ESDP Bureaucracies: Brussels, Capitals, Headquarters and Theatre 
The creation of the ESDP inevitably led to a number of functional demands related to 
supporting bureaucracies and institutions. Previously, the foreign policy machinery had been 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-004a.htm   7 
 
EIoP                                          © 2010 by Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra and Heidi Maurer 
 
relatively light reflecting the sovereignty concerns of the member states (1970-1999). The 
focal point of foreign policy coordination was the Political Committee (PoCo), consisting of 
the Political Directors, who met on a monthly basis in the capital of the Presidency. The 
meetings of PoCo were prepared by the various CFSP working groups in Brussels and by 
junior diplomats, known as the European Correspondents, in the ministries of foreign affairs. 
Finally, there was a small CFSP unit in the Directorate-General External Relations (DG E) of 
the Council Secretariat, which supported the work of the Presidency, as well as a handful of 
officials in the European Commission (Nuttall 2000; Dijkstra 2008). This structure was, 
however, unable to support the autonomous peace-keeping operations that the member states 
envisaged. 
  
The foreign policy machinery was first strengthened following the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999). This treaty created the position of the High Representative (HR) 
for the CFSP to be based in Council Secretariat. Javier Solana (1999-2009) became the first 
occupant, and as a former NATO Secretary-General and Spanish minister of foreign affairs, 
he provided the CFSP with political leadership. He was supported by a Policy Unit of 
approximately 35 civil servants. Parts of the Policy Unit were from 2004-onwards integrated 
into DG E for reasons of consistency (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). While all these 
changes were the result of a more ambitious CFSP, and not directly related to the creation of 
ESDP, they did transform the Council Secretariat, which eventually became the institutional 
basis for the ESDP. 
  
The St. Malo Declaration (1998) had recognised that the European Union “must be given 
appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a 
capability for relevant strategic planning” (art. 3). There was, however, no blueprint for the 
institutional structure and most ESDP bureaucracies developed gradually. Overall, four sorts 
of bureaucratic bodies can be identified (for an overview see Table 2): firstly, within the 
permanent representations in Brussels, military, political and security sections were 
established. The size of these sections ranges from 6 civil servants in the Permanent 
Representation of Malta to 23 in the Permanent Representation of France.2 These diplomats 
and military officers take part in the ESDP working groups. Secondly, various directorates 
and units were established within the Council Secretariat and the Commission. These 
bureaucracies employ approximately 300-350 officials and facilitate the working groups; they 
will become part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Thirdly, the ESDP units in 
the national ministries provide the Permanent Representations with instructions and deliver 
the troops, policemen and judges for the missions. Fourthly, the ESDP requires an 
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) from where missions and staff on the ground ('in theatre') 
can be directed. 
3.1 Brussels-based bureaucracies 
The initial focus of the member states was on the Brussels-based bureaucratic structures, and 
particularly on ESDP missions with a military rather than civilian character (Nowak 2006; 
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Björkdahl 2008). The Helsinki European Council (1999) established three new permanent 
bodies: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The first two are strictly 
intergovernmental Council bodies with one seat per member state, while the latter is an 
integrated military bureaucracy, based in the Council Secretariat. During one of the first 
meetings of the PSC (March 2000), foreign ministers were recommended to establish a 
Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). 
  
The Political and Security Committee replaced the Political Committee as the ‘linchpin’ of 
the CFSP/ESDP and consists of member states ambassadors (Duke 2005; Meyer 2006; Juncos 
and Reynolds 2007). Formally, all dossiers of the PSC pass through the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper) before being discussed at ministerial level. In practice, 
however, the agenda of Coreper is so overloaded that the PSC is de facto the highest 
administrative body in the ESDP. It normally meets twice a week, but it can meet 
exceptionally in case of emergency, which rarely happens. The PSC used to be chaired by the 
Presidency, but under the Lisbon Treaty will be chaired by “a representative of the High 
Representative”. The agenda of the PSC is prepared by the Nicolaides group and relies on the 
support of the Political-Military Group, consisting of junior diplomats and defence 
counsellors. Finally, RELEX Counsellors formally report to Coreper, providing the bridge to 
Community matters and dealing with legal and financial issues (Grevi 2009). 
  
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the Council and 
formally consists of the Chiefs of Defence of all the member states. On a day-to-day basis, 
however, they are represented through their Military Representatives in the Permanent 
Representations, most of whom are also the national representatives in the NATO Military 
Committee.3 Since NATO affairs are considered more important than ESDP, most EU 
business is handled by the deputy Military Representatives. The EUMC is the most important 
source of military advice for the PSC, and it discusses all military operations before the PSC 
takes decisions. Given that the implementation of military operations is often rather technical, 
the EUMC is generally the highest body in the EU amending military planning documents. 
Unlike the PSC, the EUMC has always had a permanent chairman for a period of three years, 
who is supported by a very small staff. As a result, the Presidency plays a significantly 
smaller role in military crisis management. The EUMC is supported by the EUMC working 
group. 
  
The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is not a strictly intergovernmental body. Rather it is a 
hierarchically organised expert bureaucracy, set up as a Directorate-General and located in the 
Council Secretariat. In the future, it will also become part of the External Action Service. Its 
task is to provide military expertise to the EUMC as well as the High Representative. It thus 
has two formal principals. Currently, the EUMS consists of 200+ seconded national officials 
and every member state has a number of seats. It has various directorates ranging from 
intelligence to logistics and a civil-military cell. Its Director-General is supported by an 
executive office, which has also direct liaisons with the United Nations and NATO. Within 
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the ESDP policy cycle, the EUMS plays a key role in the military planning process (Mattelaer 
2010). After the political decision to launch a military operation has been made, it drafts the 
first military planning documents and helps the Operations Commander with the Operational 
Plan and in launching the operations. While it is involved in the implementation phase, it does 
not have a formal position in the chain of command. 
  
Whereas the military structures were established rapidly, it took member states some time to 
create equivalent civilian structures. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM), for example, was established in May 2000. Its role was initially 
unclear. In its founding document (2000/354/CFSP), the cross-pillar dimension of crisis 
management was stressed, thus potentially duplicating the work of the RELEX Group and the 
European Commission. However, over time, it became the civilian equivalent of the EUMC 
preparing and planning the civilian ESDP missions. Despite the fact that the numerous 
civilian missions clearly outnumber the military operations, CIVCOM remains much lower in 
prestige than the EUMC (Cross 2010). The representatives in CIVCOM are 'merely' the 
deputies of the PSC ambassadors, compared to the Chiefs of Defence and Military 
Representatives in the EUMC. Moreover, CIVCOM, unlike the EUMC, does not have its own 
working group. A final important difference is that while the EUMC mainly performs military 
oversight of underlying working bodies, the CIVCOM is much more actively engaged in 
drafting civilian planning documents. This partially results from the fact that the supporting 
civilian structures in the Council Secretariat are much weaker and because the member states 
want to keep much closer control over civilian planning. 
  
New structures were also established within the Council Secretariat. Apart from the earlier 
mentioned EUMS, within the Directorate General for External Relations (DG E) the member 
states created a Directorate for Defence Aspects (DG E VIII) and a Directorate for Civilian 
Crisis Management (DG E IX). The role of both directorates was, however, rather different. 
While the officials in DG E VIII could rely on the EUMS and Operational Headquarters 
(OHQ, see below) for military operations, there was initially not such a civilian equivalent. 
DG E IX thus had to do everything itself. It often consulted with the EUMS because it did not 
have sufficient expertise. Together with the unclear chain of command for civilian crisis 
management, this resulted in bureaucratic reorganisation, with the creation of the Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in 2007. The CPCC became the civilian equivalent 
of the EUMS and the military OHQ. The CPCC is led by the Civilian Operations 
Commander. Finally, further reshuffling took place in 2009 when DG E VIII, DG E IX and 
parts of the EUMS were merged into the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
(CMPD). All three, the EUMS, the CPCC and the CMPD will become part of the External 
Action Service. 
  
The European Commission plays a minor role in ESDP. Until 2005, it did not even attend the 
EUMC or its working group, despite the fact that it is 'fully associated' with the CFSP. The 
Commission felt attendance would offend the member states, as it did not have much to 
contribute in terms of expertise. In civilian crisis management it plays a more active role 
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through its management of the CFSP budget (part of the Community budget), which can be 
used to finance the common costs of civilian missions. The Commission's handling of the 
CFSP budget has in the past led to inter-institutional tensions with the member states and 
officials from the Council Secretariat, which want to use the budget line in a quick and 
flexible manner (Missiroli 2006). Apart from the management of the CFSP budget, it is worth 
noting that the Commission has been particularly busy to defend Community competences 
given that there was a lot of cross-pillar overlap. The Commission has tried to avoid that 
member states use second-pillar instruments to achieve first pillar ends (Schroeder 2007; 
Hoffmeister 2008; Dijkstra 2009). Finally, during several ESDP missions, the Commission 
has proposed flanking measures using first pillar resources. 
3.2 Other ESDP bureaucracies 
ESDP has thus led to the establishment and strengthening of a whole range of Brussels-
bureaucracies. Permanent Representations now have sizeable ESDP departments, the Council 
Secretariat has more than doubled in terms of AD-grade officials and even the Commission 
had to employ new personnel. The developments in ESDP have, however, also an impact 
beyond Brussels. Since ESDP is such a sensitive field it is for the member states crucial to 
keep their own representatives in Brussels 'on message'. They can only do this by sending 
instructions of the highest quality. This, however, not only involves the national ministries of 
foreign affairs. Other ministries, such as interior, justice, defence and finance also play a key 
role when it comes to crisis management. After all, it is the policemen, judges and soldiers 
who implement the missions and their contributions must be financed. Since actual delivery is 
key, the involvement of new ministries has raised the question of domestic competence 
allocation and has created a functional need for coordination mechanisms (Vanhoonacker and 
Jacobs 2010). 
  
Furthermore there is also the most sensitive topic of the Operational Headquarters and the 
chain of command. Given the strong American apprehensions about possible duplication of 
scarce resources (Albright 1998), the EU member states initially decided to use NATO assets 
under the Berlin Plus agreement. This means the use of the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Deputy-Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) 
serves as the Operations Commander. The member states can, however, also make their own 
national OHQs available for EU operations, which they have done during military operations 
Artemis, EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and Atalanta. Both options are sub-optimal. The 
Berlin Plus option is very politicised and leads to consistency problems with other EU 
policies. The national option is very costly for the member state that makes their OHQs 
available. Thus the host nation has all kinds of incentives to terminate the operation as soon as 
possible. Because of these problems, there is a debate about whether the EU should get its 
own facilities. In 2007, a small-scale Operations Centre was established in Brussels, but it 
has, for political reasons, not been used since (Norheim-Martinsen 2010). 
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In addition to the Operational Headquarters, there are bureaucratic structures on the ground 
(see Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2008). In the theatre, the military Force Commander or 
civilian Head of Mission plays a crucial role. He/she is generally supported by political 
advisors (POLADs) seconded from the Council Secretariat, a chief of staff, legal advisors and 
press officers. Various other staff members are seconded from the member states or directly 
contracted to ensure the smooth running of the operation. Finally, there is also a need for 
close cooperation with other EU actors on the ground, such as the EU Special Representatives 
(EUSR), the Commission Head of Delegation, other international actors, and potentially other 
ESDP operations. Experience has shown how complicated these relations generally are. In 
Bosnia, for example, at times there were significant problems between the military and police 
mission, because of overlapping mandates, between the EUSR and the Commission Head of 
Delegation, and between the EUSR and Head of the police mission.  
 
Table 2: Bureaucratic actors in Brussels, the capitals and headquarters (1999 -2010) 
Supranational bureaucracy Council Secretariat 
 DG E & Policy Unit: regional desk officers 
DG E: Defence Aspects and Civilian Crisis Management / currently 
Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) 
European Union Military Staff 
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
Joint Situation Centre 
European Commission 
 RELEX: Directorate A – CFSP operations and Security Policy 
RELEX, ELARG, DEV, AidCo, ECHO: regional desk officers 
Intergovernmental bureaucracy Permanent Representations 
 Political and Security Committee 
Nicolaides Group 
European Union Military Committee + working group 
Political-Military Group 
Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
RELEX Counsellors 
Regional working groups (e.g. COWEB or COAFR) 
National bureaucracy National Ministries in the Capitals 
 Foreign ministry with Political Director / European Correspondent 
Defence / interior / justice ministry 
Finance ministry 
Chain of Command NATO, member states and on the ground 
 Operations Headquarters (OHQ): NATO's SHAPE; member states 
assets; Operations Centre 
Force Headquarters on the ground 
European Union Special Representative 
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4. Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in ESDP 
These bureaucratic institutional developments have taken place in less than a decade. It is thus 
understandable that the academic community has had a hard time keeping up. As a result, the 
research on the role of bureaucracy in the ESDP is still in its early stages. This section 
presents the state of the art and identifies fruitful avenues for further exploration. In doing so, 
it not only provides a framework, on which the remainder of this special issue builds, but it 
also situates the study of ESDP bureaucracy within the broader research agenda on the role of 
bureaucracy in the European Union. 
  
The study of bureaucracy goes a long way back. One of the key references remains Max 
Weber ([1922] 1978), who identified professional bureaucracy as one of the building blocks 
of the modern state. Yet since the publication of ‘Economy and Society’, the political context 
in which governments are operating has drastically changed (Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 
1977; Slaughter 2004). One key development is the increasing complexity of political 
problems requiring responses far beyond the capacities of national governments and defying 
the sovereignty of the territorial state. After the Second World War, a whole range of 
international and regional organisations have been established. All these forums are supported 
by their own permanent bureaucracies in addition to the day-to-day intergovernmental 
contacts between national civil servants (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Reinalda and 
Verbeeck 1998; Olsen 2006). Through these new layers of international and supranational 
governance, international organisations defy the Weberian hierarchical model of top-down 
policy-making (Rosenau 1992). Decisions are taken through a process of intense consultation 
and negotiation amongst politicians, civil servants, the private sector and civil society acting 
at different levels. 
  
The European Union is undoubtedly the most developed example of a system of multi-level 
governance (Marks et al. 1996; Kohler-Koch 1996; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger 2006). In a growing number of areas its member states are no longer the only ones 
at the centre of policy-making. Policy is initiated, negotiated and implemented through an 
interaction between different levels of public authority. As long as the study of the European 
integration process was dominated by theories of International Relations, the central question 
was whether it were the member states or the supranational institutions who affected the pace 
and dynamics of European integration. The focus was on 'history making decisions' (Peterson 
1995) and since states were treated as a black box there was no room for the study of 
bureaucracies. From the 1990s-onwards, however, the EU was increasingly conceptualised as 
a polity comparable to other political systems (Hix 1994 and 1998; Caporaso 1998) and the 
study of day-to-day policy-making began to occupy a central place on the European research 
agenda. The EU was no longer seen as a unique case. It became a venue for testing concepts 
and hypotheses using comparative policy analysis, as well as other disciplines and 
approaches, such as public administration and organisation theory.  
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These alternative approaches have triggered a new interest in the administrative organisation 
of the EU institutions (Page 1997; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Olsen 2003; Hoffmann and 
Turk 2006; Trondal 2007). The European Commission, in particular, as the main European 
executive and a centre of information and expertise has received a lot of attention (e.g. Cini 
1996; Nugent 2000; Shore 2000; Hooghe 2001; Dimitrakopoulos 2004; Egeberg 2006; 
Suvarierol 2008). It is no longer just studied as actor impacting on European integration, but 
also as an evolving organisation affecting the policy-making process on a day-to-day basis 
(Dimitrakopoulos 2004).  
  
Administrative research on the Council and the European Parliament remains more limited. 
The role of the European Parliament, for example, only started to take off after the Maastricht 
Treaty (1993) when it became a co-legislator. The focus of the research remains on its 
political powers and structures rather than on the underlying administration (Neuhold 2001; 
Shackleton 2006; Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton 2007). Studying the Council is complex 
since there is not just one body but a wide variety of players going from the working groups 
(Beyers 2005; Fouilleux, de Maillard and Smith 2005; Häge 2008) to Coreper (Lewis 1998) 
and the Council Secretariat (Christiansen 2002; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008; 
Dijkstra 2010). More recently also the role of committees (Wessels 1998; Tonra 2000; 
Egeberg, Schäfer and Trondal 2003; Christiansen and Larsson 2007, Gornitzka and Sverdrup 
2007; Neuhold 2008; Quaglia, De Francesco and Radaelli 2008) and agencies (Shapiro 1997; 
Kelemen 2002; Gerardin, Munoz and Petit 2005; Pollak and Puntscher-Riekmann 2008; 
Dehousse 2008) have received considerable attention.   
  
The ‘comparative politics’ and ‘public administration’ turn did initially not receive much 
resonance in the field of European foreign policy. CFSP is traditionally the domain of 
international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts (e.g. Hill 1993, 1996; Hill and 
Smith 2005; White 2001; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Manners 2002; Hyde-Price 2006). In 
both traditions, bureaucracy does not play a vital role. There is, however, a more simple 
reason why the analytical study of bureaucracy has for a long time not been on the radar-
screen of European foreign policy scholars: until the Amsterdam Treaty, there was not much 
bureaucracy to speak of with the member states doing most of the work from the national 
capitals. Research on key administrative bodies was thus generally integrated in broader 
studies on European foreign policy cooperation (e.g. Hill 1983 and 1996; de Schoutheete 
1986; Pijpers, Regelsberger and Wessels 1988; Whitman and Manners 2000; Smith 2004). 
One of the most detailed studies on the foreign policy bureaucracies is by Simon Nuttall 
(1992; 2000). His unique and extremely rich books examine the day-to-day workings of the 
machinery of European foreign policy primarily through historical lenses. 
  
The creation of ESDP, as shown above, has proved a real watershed for European foreign 
policy and its underlying administrative structures. As explained in the previous section it has 
led to the creation of new structures in Brussels and in the capitals and to the reinforcement of 
existing bureaucratic bodies. Importantly, even in this sensitive field, decisions are now 
increasingly taken by actors operating at different levels – in national ministries, the 
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permanent representations, supranational institutions and the civilian and military command 
and control structures. By observing interaction between these actors at the different levels, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to treat European foreign policy as a purely intergovernmental 
phenomenon and for scholars to restrict themselves to the traditional theories of International 
Relations. Instead, it is indeed appealing to use insights from comparative politics, public 
administration and (multi-level) governance.  
  
Embracing multiple conceptual lenses has several advantages. As has already been argued in 
the introduction to this article, these approaches do not limit themselves to the political level, 
but specifically pay attention to the role and influence of non-elected players in the policy-
making process. They may therefore provide useful concepts and tools to get a better 
understanding of the daily dynamics of ESDP policy-making. While it may not be sufficient 
to simply transplant their analytical frames to European foreign policy, a comparative 
perspective gives a good starting base, encouraging scholarly learning and sharpening our 
analytical instruments. Furthermore bringing in other disciplines of the social sciences gives a 
better insight to what extent European foreign policy actually is sui generis. It also makes an 
end to the relative isolation of CFSP scholars, sparking a debate with researchers dealing with 
other policy areas. 
  
In an attempt to stimulate further research on the role of bureaucracies in European foreign 
policy-making and to bring some structure to the future debate, the remainder of this section 
discusses the current state of the art and suggests questions for further inquiry. Four main 
issues are addressed: the ‘identity’ of the bureaucratic players in ESDP; their influence; 
patterns of interaction; and their legitimacy and accountability. 
4.1 Who are these ESDP officials? 
In line with the broader tradition of public administration, one of the first questions relates to 
the study of the civil service as a social system (Page 1992) – i.e. what are the characteristics 
of the diplomats and civil servants dealing with ESDP? Issues of particular interest are their 
educational and professional qualifications, national background, the mode of recruitment and 
appointment, the means of promotion and, last but not least, their values and norms (Page 
1992; Hooghe 2001; Scheinman and Feld 1972). When ESDP was created, the EU institutions 
had very little expertise in civilian and military crisis management. Thus, the Council 
Secretariat had to recruit a large part of its personnel from elsewhere. While some of its staff 
came from other international organisations (e.g. NATO), most vacancies were filled with 
seconded national officials coming not only from national ministries of foreign affairs but 
also from sectoral ministries such as defence and the interior (Dijkstra 2008). The question 
arises how the involvement of new players beyond those of the diplomats that have 
traditionally dominated European foreign policy impact on policy preferences and 
instruments. Military staff, for example, may have a quite different view from traditional 
diplomats when addressing foreign policy challenges. 
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Recent studies illustrate that ESDP officials and diplomats come from a wide range of 
educational and professional backgrounds and vary in terms of seniority and status. Juncos 
and Pomorska (2010) give an overview of the national and professional backgrounds of 
officials in the Council Secretariat and how these people perceive their individual roles as 
secretariat officials. They demonstrate that even within the Council Secretariat the role 
perception of the officials vary according to their personal background and their respective 
unit. A study by Howorth (2011), which discusses the profiles of the PSC ambassadors, 
shows that they have some typical foreign service characteristics (education in history, 
political science or law, multi-lingual, and experience abroad) and that most have specific 
expertise in the field of security and defence through previous experience. While the age of 
the ambassadors – and thus their seniority – varies across member states, 'circumstantial 
evidence' suggests that it has increased with new generations arriving in Brussels. Cross 
(2010) furthermore compares the national representatives in the EUMC with those in 
CIVCOM. She finds substantial differences between both committees in terms of expertise, 
seniority and common identities. Overall, the ESDP officials are clearly different from the 
supranational Monnet-ideal type civil servant, serving a life-time promoting European 
interests. 
  
The multi-national and multi-level character of the ESDP administration also raises questions 
about their predominant norms and values, and how European interaction impacts upon the 
interests and identities of those involved. Scholars at the European University Institute (EUI), 
for example, have given special attention to the world views of actors such as the High 
Representative for CFSP Javier Solana (1999-2009), various Commissioners, and the Director 
General of DG E Robert Cooper (e.g. Vennesson 2007). A case study on the PSC by Howorth 
(2011) shows that its members are very attached to the EU (50%) and that 80% believe the 
development of an EU identity necessary. Yet the ESDP bureaucracy is not limited to the 
PSC. An interesting group in this respect are the seconded national officials in the Council 
Secretariat which, in some units, represent between 50 to 100% of the staff. They are 
supposed to be the ‘ears and the eyes’ of the member states in Brussels but the question arises 
how processes of socialisation and social learning affect their identity and preferences 
(Checkel 2003). 
  
It is clear from the overview above that the systematic study of administrative players in 
ESDP is only just starting and that much of the available empirical material remains 
unexplored. A further mapping of the characteristics of the different actors in the day-day 
policy-making process, beyond that of the level of PSC, should not only give us a better idea 
of who the administrative actors are, but also how their different background and recruitment 
impacts upon the policy-making process. Secondly, the mushrooming of ESDP administrative 
bodies provides us with an interesting laboratory for testing institutional theories of how 
norms, rules and procedures affect behaviour or emerge. Do they merely have an impact on 
cost-benefit calculations or does participation in European-level networks also lead to new 
supranational loyalties that complement or even replace national identities?  
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4.2 How and under what conditions do ESDP officials matter? 
One of the crucial research questions in the study of bureaucracy is the extent to which civil 
servants matter. In line with the formal dichotomy between the political and administrative 
level (e.g. Wilson 1887; Weber [1922] 1978), the general (normative) idea is that career civil 
servants, in contrast to their political principals, are non-elected and should thus not assert 
excessive political influence over policy outcomes (see also below). The academic literature, 
however, has long recognised that permanent administrations are more than neutral 
secretariats and often have their own interests and opinions on the preferred solutions to 
societal problems (e.g. Crozier 1962; Allison 1971; Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; 
Urban 1982; Peters 2009).  
  
Within ESDP the formal decision-making power lies with the foreign ministers meeting in the 
Foreign Affairs Council (previously: General Affairs and External Relations Council) and 
deciding by unanimity. As the democratically elected political principals, they have the final 
word. Most of the preparatory work, however, is done at bureaucratic levels in the PSC, the 
Council working groups, and the Council Secretariat. In case of a military or civilian 
operation, the Council approves the Crisis Management Concept, the Council Decision 
(previously: Joint Action) and other planning documents. Apart from some salient issues 
(mandate, finances, troop levels, choice of headquarters, appointments), the ministers hardly 
ever amend the proposals prepared by the PSC. However, this does not necessarily imply that 
civil servants have a lot of influence, as they may anticipate the reactions of their political 
principals (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Häge 2008). The PSC, for example, is very wary of the 
ministers re-opening a dossier when a compromise does not suit them.  
  
The political influence of civil servants depends on their bureaucratic resources. These are 
firstly their formal competences (e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007). Given 
the sensitivities of security and defence, the foreign ministers have been very reluctant to give 
formal authority to the bureaucratic level. For functional reasons they have, however, 
delegated a number of tasks. The PSC, for example, exercises ‘political control and strategic 
direction’ during the course of an ESDP operation. As a result of its permanent and Brussels-
based nature, it has more continuity than the Council and can meet on an emergency basis. 
Part of this authority is further delegated to the Operations and the Force Commander. Yet 
contrary to the first pillar, few formal competences have been delegated to the EU institutions 
(Wagner 2003; Dijkstra 2008, 2010). One example is the chairmanship of some Council 
bodies. The EUMC, and under the Lisbon Treaty also the PSC, has a permanent chair. 
Although the person at the helm is supposed to act in the broader European interest, he/she 
can potentially use the position to put certain questions on the agenda or to steer the 
negotiations in a certain direction (Tallberg 2006). 
  
A further significant bureaucratic resource, generally accepted as the principal source of 
influence of the administration is information and expertise (e.g. Weber [1922] 1978; Peters 
2009). Such information asymmetries also pertain to the field of security and defence, as the 
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density and complexity of information is high (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). A useful 
typology is the distinction between content expertise, process expertise and information on 
the state of play (Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006). As regards content expertise, the military 
services – and particularly the national ministries of defence – clearly hold an informational 
advantage in ESDP with the result that the Council and even the PSC hardly comment on 
military details. On process expertise, civil servants generally hold an informational 
asymmetry over the political principals. Furthermore, the civil servants in the EU institutions, 
particularly the Council Secretariat (and its legal service) have more information on the state 
of play than the officials from the member states. The creation of an External Action Service, 
which enjoys access to the Union delegations in third countries, could further strengthen the 
position of Brussels vis-à-vis the national capitals. Yet with the exception of Dijkstra (2010) 
and Klein (2010), informational strengths of civil servants in ESDP are not yet explored in the 
literature. 
  
The increasing role of bureaucracy in ESDP policy-making invites for a better understanding 
of the ability of civil servants and diplomats to shape ESDP decisions in line with their own 
preferences. The key question is to what extent bureaucracies can use their resources to assert 
political influence over outcomes. The influence question is not only crucial for our general 
comprehension of the policy process but is also relevant from a normative perspective (cf. 
section 4.4). Assuming an overriding importance of knowledge and expertise as a source of 
influence (Peters 2009), we especially encourage further research into how and under what 
conditions informational asymmetries have an independent impact on political decisions. This 
is challenging since also in other EU policy areas this question requires further investigation 
(Moravcsik 2005). Furthermore, measuring influence is methodologically very demanding. 
As has been argued by Dür (2008), however, questions of influence are too important to be 
ignored and in recent years new methodological steps have been made. An important sub-
question in the discussion about influence is the oversight mechanisms available at the 
political level for it to make sure that the administration acts in accordance its political 
preferences. Here scholars can draw on principal-agent literature, which is omnipresent in the 
disciplines of political science and public administration (see Pollack 1997, Kassim and 
Menon 2003, Miller 2005).  
4.3 How do ESDP officials interact? 
Bureaucracies are not monolithic entities, but consist of different organisational units that 
may have their own preferences and ideas about the preferred solutions to particular 
problems. Administrative bureaux tend to jealously guard their territory and in case of 
competition or overlapping competencies they are likely to defend their turf (Downs 1967). In 
addition, officials generally internalise the dominant views of their organisational 
environment and will try to have these viewpoints reflected in the policy outcome. The way 
bureaucratic politics may affect the policy-making process has been famously illustrated by 
Graham Allison in his seminal study on the Cuban missile crisis. He showed how, back in 
1962, the United States' decision to respond to the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba with a 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-004a.htm   18 
 
EIoP                                          © 2010 by Sophie Vanhoonacker, Hylke Dijkstra and Heidi Maurer 
 
naval blockade rather than an air strike was based not merely on purely rational deliberations 
of national interest, but strongly influenced by the way the United States governmental 
bureaucracy was organised (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999). 
  
The creation of the ESDP has raised new questions of competence allocation or ‘who should 
be responsible for what’, both within and amongst institutions. The integration of new 
structures in the existing hierarchy and the accompanying processes of internal re-
organisation has triggered rivalry and tensions. The creation of the PSC, for example, initially 
led to turf battles with Coreper, debating who would formally submit dossiers to the Council 
(Nuttall 2000; Duke 2005). The original division of tasks in the Council Secretariat between 
the Policy Unit and DG E whereby the former was in charge of policy formulation and the 
latter was cast in a supporting role, was never accepted by DG E (Duke and Vanhoonacker 
2006). In addition there were also strains in inter-institutional relations, especially between 
the Council Secretariat and the Commission. In line with Downs’ hypothesis that fights will 
be most fierce in areas of competing competencies, Dijkstra (2009) finds that the rivalry was 
strongest in civilian crisis management, where there was already a long Commission tradition. 
In the area of military matters, where the Commission has no expertise it has accepted its 
minimal role without problems.  
  
The complex character of the decision making process and the multiple actors involved also 
put high demands on the coordination process. The number of organisational and managerial 
challenges is manifold and situated at various levels: at the European level (intra- and inter-
institutional), between the EU and the member states, and at the national level (Blockmans 
2008; Vanhoonacker 2008). In addition ESDP also requires coordination between the civilian 
and military dimension (Norheim-Martinsen 2010), rules on interaction with third players 
such as NATO and the United Nations (Tardy 2005; Reichard 2006; Duke 2008, Major 2008; 
Wouters and Ruys 2008; Hofmann 2009) and, last but not least, coherence with the other 
aspects of EU external and internal policy (Duke and Ojanen 2006; Keohane 2008; Eriksson 
and Rhinard 2009; Weiss and Dalferth 2009). 
  
Building on the findings of the above-mentioned exploratory studies, further research on the 
interaction of ESDP officials could be organised around the two central themes of intra- and 
inter-institutional competence allocation and coordination; as well as on the impact of 
organisational structures on policy outcomes. A mapping of competencies and coordination 
mechanisms in ESDP not only allows one to get a better insight into the day-to-day policy-
making process but also to identify possible weaknesses in terms of duplication, 
inconsistency, and policy-making gaps (Kassim et al. 2000). A comparative study of ESDP 
coordination mechanisms at the national level could furthermore link up with the broader 
Europeanisation debate on the convergence of national administrative structures as a result of 
European integration (Knill 2001).    
  
Secondly, there seems to be great scope for further research into the impact of organisational 
structures on processes of ESDP policy-making. Organisation theory has learned us that 
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structures are never neutral and that they will influence the choices that are made (Hamond 
2001). The organisation of issues on either a territorial or functional basis will lead to 
different patterns of interaction and will forge policy networks along different lines (Gullick 
1937; Egeberg 2004). Organisations where horizontal processes of bargaining are dominant 
operate differently from those organised in a vertical and more hierarchical way. At a time 
where the member states are setting up the External Action Service, questions about the 
interrelationship between organisational structures and policy-making may prove highly 
relevant. 
4.4 To whom are ESDP officials accountable? 
When trying to understand the role of bureaucracies it is not enough to study their internal 
characteristics, but one should also situate them within the broader political context in which 
they operate (Olsen 2003). The key role of non-elected officials in policy-making creates the 
risk of the assertion of excessive political influence by bureaucracy (Weber [1922] 1978), 
raising normative questions about the democratic quality of the political system. The multi-
level nature of EU policy-making, the overall debate on the EU's democratic deficit, and the 
traditionally strong role of the executive in the field of security and defence ascribe pivotal 
importance to the question of legitimacy and accountability in ESDP. 
  
For a long time the debate of the democratic deficit in the European Union was mainly 
confined to the first pillar (Lord 1998; Majone 1998; Sharpf 1999; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; 
Moravcsik 2002; Hix 2005). In the early 1990s the growing transfer of national competencies 
to the European level and the lack of input from the European citizens were increasingly seen 
as a problem for EU democracy. The interactions between different levels of governance lead 
to the dispersion of political authority where  the lines of accountability were not always 
clear. While some downplayed the problem by arguing that the EU derives its legitimacy 
from the efficiency of its policy output (Scharpf 1999; Majone 1998), others have pleaded for 
increased public input and for standards in analogy with national parliamentary democracies. 
For a very long time, the emphasis was on increasing the powers of the European Parliament, 
but more recently there has also been an attempt to increase the involvement of national 
parliaments. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, for example, the member states adopted an 
'orange card' procedure, which can act as an emergency break on the drafting of EU 
legislation. 
  
In foreign policy where decisions are taken by unanimity, there was traditionally a consensus 
that the member states themselves were the main source of legitimacy. Ministers could, in 
principle, always be held accountable through national mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
declaratory character of European foreign policy made the lack of public influence on 
outcomes less problematic. With the development of an operational foreign policy, the debate 
about the normative standards has spilled over to CFSP (e.g. Barbé 2004; Diedrichs 2004; 
Bono 2006; Crum 2006; Wagner 2006; Sjursen 2007; Lord 2008; Stie 2007). Scholars argue 
that in practice it is not so simple to hold ministers accountable for decisions taken at the 
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international level. National parliaments do not always have the required information and 
their powers of scrutiny differ widely. While in some member states they are involved in 
defining the national position or can veto the deployment of troops, in others they have no 
role at all (Anghel et al. 2008; Peters, Wagner and Deitelhoff 2010). Even if a national 
parliament has a veto power, it may be very reluctant to use it due to the high costs in terms of 
reputation and credibility (Moravcsik 1994). 
  
For this article particularly relevant is that the preparatory and implementing policy process 
largely takes place at the administrative level, raising the question of to whom exactly actors 
such as the PSC and the officials in the Council Secretariat are accountable (Stie 2010). The 
heavy reliance on the technical and procedural expertise of diplomats, civil servants and 
military staff creates scope for decisions that may be biased towards their own interests and 
preferred views. In addition, experts never entirely oversee the consequences of their policy 
recommendations. There is thus a risk that decisions taken in the ESDP are insufficiently 
representative of what the broader European public wants.  
  
The academic debate on accountability in ESDP is only just starting and therefore still at the 
standard setting phase – i.e. against which benchmarks should we assess the democratic 
character ESDP? Multiple questions for further elaboration and discussion arise. Does the 
sensitive nature of foreign and security policy and the need for rapid decisions mean that the 
political authority should in the first place remain with the member states? Or does the EU 
participation in civilian and military crisis management increasingly require the use of 
standards that are in not compatible with national parliamentary democracy? And if so, does 
the solution mainly lay in enhancing the powers of the European Parliament or should 
democratic control primarily be a responsibility of national parliaments or other players such 
as transnational parliamentary institutions? Are solutions in the sphere of an extension of 
parliamentary control sufficient or do we also need to create deliberative fora where citizens 
can publicly discuss and challenge policy-makers before decisions are taken? While it is 
hoped that the debate will also spread to the broader public, the academic community can play 
an important role in formulating the questions and sharpening the arguments of the different 
perspectives. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Since its advent, European foreign policy was mainly a diplomatic forum for coordination of 
views, and it could be characterised as a “charmed circle, with interference neither from the 
EC Institutions nor from other ministries at home” (Nuttall 2000, 2). With ESDP this situation 
has changed radically. The demanding character of civilian and military operations has 
required the set-up of a whole range of new administrative bodies that are vital to the day-to-
day running of the ESDP machinery. In addition, it has moved the centre of gravity from the 
national capitals to Brussels (Allen 1998) and led to the involvement of several new ministries 
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in the EU foreign policy process. Today policy-making in ESDP is more and more the result 
of the interaction of a wide variety of players at different governmental levels, a process that 
is further reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty and new players such as the European External 
Action Service and the Union delegations in third countries. 
  
As illustrated in this article, interactions in the area of ESDP have become increasingly 
‘bureaucratic’ rather than diplomatic (cf. Puchala 1972). Policy is conducted according to 
standard procedures and rules, which are geared towards the reaching and implementation of 
concrete decisions. The prominent role of diplomats and civil servants in policy-making 
makes it imperative for researchers to also pay attention to what is happening beyond the 
political level. The central tenet of this article is that insights from other disciplines and 
strands of the social sciences such as comparative public policy, public administration, multi-
level governance may prove useful for further enquiry, even if they may need adapting to the 
specific characteristics of foreign policy. 
  
In an attempt to stimulate and frame further research in a very promising and rapidly 
developing area, this article has presented the state of the art, in terms of the literature, and 
identified four main areas for future analysis. Building upon earlier scholarly work on (EU) 
bureaucracies, it has identified options for further investigation into the identity, influence, 
interaction and democratic accountability of administrative actors. The questions that are put 
forward for each of these areas are not new, nor exhaustive. These issues have also proven 
pertinent to researchers in other national, European or international contexts and are now also 
of relevance to an increasingly institutionalised ESDP. Addressing them should not only 
contribute to our empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding of policy-making in 
ESDP, but should also feed into the broader debate on the role of international bureaucracies 
in today’s society.  
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Endnotes 
1 ESDP has become the Common Security and Defence Policy under the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
2 Source: websites of both Permanent Representations. 
3 The exceptions are the six non-NATO members plus Belgium, France and Luxembourg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
